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Abstract  
 
Like in most developing countries, the level of entrepreneurship growth as 
measured by the number of new firm start-ups has become a central economic 
issue in Zimbabwe. Necessity and opportunity-driven entrepreneurial 
activities in the country are being driven by weakening economic growth, 
poverty, idiosyncratic macro-uncertainties and high levels of unemployment. 
The country has consistently been listed by the Transparent International 
Perception of Corruption Index as one of the most corrupt countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa outside a war zone. The study examined the nexus between 
entrepreneurial activities and corruption in Zimbabwe using Ordinary 
Least Regression equation for the period 1998 to 2016. Our findings 
suggest that productive entrepreneurial activities in Zimbabwe are 
significantly being curtailed by regressive tax regimes coupled with enfeebled 
public institutions. We also demonstrate a positive one way causality 
running from entrepreneurial activities to corruption and, hence proving the 
applicability of the greasing hypothesis of corruption in Zimbabwe. The 
study recommends a number of policy prescriptions that include: reducing 
levels of taxes on entrepreneurial activities, eliminating red-tape and 
regulations that add costs on opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, 
increasing the effectiveness of public institutions especially those that deal 
with entrepreneurs, introducing robust legislation aimed at reducing public 
officials’ opportunities for rent seeking in entrepreneurial activities that are 
most prone to corrupt practices. In addition, there is need to monitor 
bureaucrats and impose severe penalties in order to make corruption payoffs 
too risky. Our study contributes to the literature on the greasing effect of 
corruption on entrepreneurial activities in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the years starting from 2000, the Transparent International Perception of Corruption Indexes have 
unfailingly ranked Zimbabwe as one of the countries with highest corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
country was ranked 4.1 in 1999 but the ranking has since deteriorated progressively to 2.2 in 2018. Putting 
into context, the country’s main trading partners in the Southern African region, South Africa is ranked 4.3, 
Botswana (6.1), Zambia (3.7) and Malawi (3.1). In the Sub-Sahara region, only war-torn and political unstable 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Chad, Sudan and Somalia fare much worse 
than Zimbabwe. However, of critical significance is that Zimbabwe is endowed with abundant natural 
resources and has advanced human capital development that can foster an entrepreneurial spirit among its 
poverty-stricken citizens. Even though the country has not been listed in all editions of the Global 
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Entrepreneurship Index which measures the health of the entrepreneurship ecosystem in a given country, the 
spirit of entrepreneurship in Zimbabwe is alive and evident in all sectors of the economy. Since the downturn 
of the economy that started in the second decade after independence in 1980, entrepreneurial activities have 
been propelled by a number of factors that include unrelenting decline in economic growth, widespread 
poverty, political instability, high levels of unemployment and unfettered state interventions in 
entrepreneurial activities and new start-ups operations. In addition, one of the main cause of corruption in 
Zimbabwe has been linked to bad government regulations and investment policies that has been frequently 
creating corrupt incentives for bureaucrats, policy makers and some unproductive entrepreneurs.  
Nevertheless, the entrepreneurship ecosystem in Zimbabwe is in fine fettle given that the country is one 
of the few countries in Africa with the most educated and resilient people. Most of its people are able to 
identify opportunities for innovation, incubate new business start-ups and are willing to take risks given 
appropriate returns. Most entrepreneurs that operate in the shadow economy are able to create geographically 
concentrated networks in all parts of the country and to a large extent in the region as well. The 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in Zimbabwe includes a well-developed human capital base which provides 
potential entrants with requisite opportunities, skills and knowledge to start their own business and to rapidly 
absorb and embrace new technology. In addition, the majority of the population is young and highly trained 
and hence, are able to embrace the rapid growth of social networks in order to create unique products and 
services, and to develop new products by integrating new technology.  
However, in recent years the downside entrepreneurial risks that has been impeding the growth of 
entrepreneurial activities in Zimbabwe include a litany of factors such as; institutional inadequacies, political 
instability, high taxation regimes, idiosyncratic uncertainties, lack of  collateral and endemic bureaucratic 
corruption. As a consequence, the entrepreneurship environment has become difficult to manage, especially the 
optimisation of returns on entrepreneurial investments. Both current and potential new entrepreneurs face 
credit and capital constraints which force them either not to invest or to defer investment decisions. In 
particular, the institutional environment which is often characterised by economic instability and political 
uncertainties make it particularly difficult for existing entrepreneurs to reduce transactional costs and to 
realise identified opportunities. The country has been ‘blessed’ with a reputation for high public corruption. 
The country has also been finding it difficult to commit itself to trustworthy, non-extortionate corruption 
policies and to convince potential entrepreneurs of its dedication to eradicate the scourge of corruption. As a 
result domestic investment, foreign direct investment inflows and the growth of entrepreneurial activities 
have significantly deteriorated with growing public corruption.  
According to Global Entrepreneur Index (2018) the Sub-Sahara region’s lowest average scores are in the 
areas of start-up skills, risk acceptance and risk capital. However, the entrepreneurial environment in 
Zimbabwe is also exposed to some idiosyncratic factors unlike its trading partners.  For instance, the country 
has extensive regulations and rules that encumber entrepreneurial innovation and diffusion of technological 
progress. Politicians and bureaucrats are heavily involved in most private exchange markets. This often gives 
birth to corruption as well as accelerating illegal practices such as smuggling, transfer pricing, externalisation 
of foreign currency, bribery, and other illicit activities that impact on the health of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. As a result, rent seeking activities and subsequent corruption rentals have natural increasing 
returns.  
Research on the linkage between corruption and entrepreneurial activities in Zimbabwe is difficult because 
many causes of entrepreneurial activities also seem to be consequences of corruption. There are also numerous 
feedback loops between the two variables that make it hard to isolate the underlying causes of corruption and 
its impact on entrepreneurial growth. Furthermore, owing to requests for corruption rentals, many domestic 
and foreign investors that intend to employ simple production technologies in Zimbabwe are likely to prefer 
forming joint ventures with local entrepreneurs rather than Greenfield investments that can provide 
entrepreneurs with opportunities for outsourcing and long-term partnerships. This is because most local 
entrepreneurs are likely to be familiar with corrupt practices, and hence, facilitating the entry of lower return 
joint ventures into the domestic market.  
On the hand, foreign investors intending on using sophisticated production technologies, may fear leakage 
of technological know-how and loss of essential knowledge to corrupt entrepreneurs. Above all, bureaucrats 
have been creating artificial bottlenecks in the economy by formulating and implement unnecessary 
regulations and policies as an avenue to extract more speed money from potential investors and entrepreneurs. 
The unnecessary gridlocks are reducing national productivity and service quality since bribe-seeking 
bureaucrats and politicians are likely to favour national projects that provide a robust foundation for 
corruption rentals than those that accrue benefits to the public. As a survival strategy, existing entrepreneurs’ 
having been by-passing extortionate corruption rentals by opting to operate in the shadow economy where tax 
records are not kept, hence, resulting in low taxation revenue to the government. Thus, an increase in 
corruption rentals is likely to make rent seeking and corruption activities more rewarding to entrepreneurs 
operating in the shadow economy. The blight of public corruption and rent seeking activities have consistently 
been dislocating domestic savings from productive public investment towards unproductive entrepreneurial 
activities, hence, fuel more corrupt practices through reverse causation effect. This is because an economy such 
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as one in Zimbabwe with high corruption has multiple equilibrium with bad equilibria exhibiting very high 
levels of corruption and rent seeking and low national output.  
For instance, a vicious and iterative process has been operating in Zimbabwe where corruption has limited 
entrepreneurial growth and low entrepreneurial growth has been encouraging corruption. Arguably 
corruption has become a major source of competitive advantage for existing entrepreneurs by acting as a 
barrier to new entrants. Entry barriers, a result of bureaucratic corruption rentals affect potential 
entrepreneurs especially those that cannot afford high corruption rentals that are required in order to 
circumvent government regulations and policies.  
The problem is that grand corruption comes with three major costs that affect both existing and new 
entrepreneurs. To begin with, there is a rent seeking cost to the entrepreneur which represents the cost of the 
resources used up in seeking the corruption rents or overcoming bureaucratic restrictions and regulations. 
This cost includes the loss of potentially investible resources by the entrepreneur in bribes that are transferred 
to bureaucrats who are likely to use them less efficiently. The direct effect of this cost is a reduction in 
entrepreneurial activities and an indirect effect on domestic investment and economic growth. Second, 
corruption rentals comes with a heavy social cost to the economy owing to unnecessary regulations and policy 
restrictions created by bureaucrats. The social cost that bureaucrats create on behalf of the government 
include; import restrictions that create monopoly rents, monopoly rents themselves, subsidies to politically 
correct entrepreneurial businesses that never grow up, and subsidies to special-interest groupings of 
entrepreneurs that are linked to the ruling party. Thus, politically connected entrepreneurs are likely to be 
less productive but represent a major drain on public funds. Social costs associated with corruption rentals 
therefore generate deadweight losses for society leading to growth of poverty and lower economic growth. 
Third, corruption is an indirect retrogressive tax on entrepreneurial investments. Superfluous policy 
regulations and restrictions on entrepreneurial activities increase transaction costs and efficiency losses. In 
addition, policy regulations and restrictions have a reverse causation effect on the growth of corruption and 
hence, cause significant reductions in economic efficiency and in turn more deadweight welfare losses. This 
often results in further reductions of domestic investment, economic growth and development.  The other 
main consequence of corruption is a larger shadow economy that does not contribute meaningfully to 
government tax revenues and hence, causing smaller and less productive national capital stock. Eventually, 
this might cause distorted and inefficient allocations of public and private resources.  
The study is important for a number of reasons. First; entrepreneurship is vital to investment and 
economic growth, development and well-being of the whole society. This is because entrepreneurs create 
quality jobs and hence, leading to reduction of poverty, starvation and unemployment. Entrepreneurs drive 
technological progress and shape innovative activities in any economy through joint ventures with foreign 
investors. Entrepreneurs speed up structural changes in the economy by enhancing knowledge management, 
introducing more product and services offerings and also by facilitating rapid technology adoption and 
diffusion. By introducing new competition, entrepreneurs contribute directly to the country’s productivity. 
Productive entrepreneurs catalyse international trade competitiveness, domestic investment, and economic 
growth. Perhaps a more apropos observation in developing countries such as Zimbabwe is that entrepreneurial 
activities generate positive externalities that benefit urban and rural communities, societies and humanity at 
large. This is because most entrepreneurs utilise innovative and affordable technologies that can solve various 
socio-economic issues that beset developing economies such as sewage reticulation, food and water shortages, 
environmental pollution and sustainability. 
Second, in circumstances such as obtaining in Zimbabwe where necessity-driven entrepreneurship is more 
predominant when compared to opportunities-driven entrepreneurship, the economy can derive immense 
benefits from self-employment initiatives particularly in situations where formal work options are less 
available, and where employee redundancies and poverty are rampant. Formal unemployment levels in 
developing countries are high and as a result, pursuing necessity-driven entrepreneurial activities could offer a 
practical avenue for escaping abject poverty and starvation. Third, entrepreneurs are known to disrupt the 
market equilibrium by introducing new products and services in different market segments. Therefore, 
entrepreneurial activities that are highly innovative and technology-driven are likely to drive out less 
productive and inefficient mature firms from the economy. Innovative entrepreneurial activities in developing 
countries are also likely to advance production and marketing frontiers. Fourth as observed in many empirical 
literatures, corruption when practiced by self-serving bureaucrats and politicians is likely to hurt potential 
innovative activities of entrepreneurs more than everyday production of existing firms.  
The argument advanced in literature is that entrepreneurs at start-up stage or entry level often require 
bureaucrat-supplied goods and services such as trading permits, licences, import quotas, foreign currency 
allocation, tax documents, import licences and other important documents. However, the acquisition of these 
documents has a high inelastic demand with respect to price and entrepreneurial activities cannot take off 
without these documents. Hence, acquiring these critical documents exposes not only new entrepreneurs but 
existing ones to corruption and rent seeking rentals. When entrepreneurs fail to pay corruption rentals they 
are likely to cease current and future long-term investment plans. The impact on the economy is seen by the 
reduction of the country’s capital stock. Fifth, corruption rentals represent a major cost to entrepreneurs. For 
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instance, start-up investment expenditures such as roads, buildings and pipelines represent sunk costs that are 
incurred by entrepreneurs. Such costs cannot be redeployed elsewhere within the economy if the institutional 
environment of a country deteriorates or changes. This suggests that corruption is costly on irreversible 
entrepreneurial investment decisions. In Zimbabwe, grand corruption is a common occurrence and is rarely 
frowned upon. Politicians and bureaucrats often abuse their positions by delaying the issuances of permits and 
licences until offered speed money. Unfortunately, this normally happens when entrepreneurs have already 
incurred sunk costs which cannot be easily recouped without incurring most substantial costs. 
In empirical literature that investigates the subject of corruption there are two major strands of 
dichotomies. The first construct is that corruption is an efficient grease that helps entrepreneurs avoid 
cumbersome bureaucracy in order to acquire government-supplied documents (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; 
Muzurura, 2018; Wiseman, 2016). This argument owes its genesis from studies by Leff (1964) and Huntington 
(1968) who first proposed the corruption greasing hypotheses. The basis of the argument is related to the 
public choice theory of corruption that asserts that self-interested bureaucrats and politicians are rational 
utility maximizers and therefore, are expected seek low-cost ways to maximize utility in line with their 
position. Therefore in order to circumvent cumbersome bureaucracy and government regulations, paying 
corruption rentals could be the only way of speeding up the issuance of necessary documents, hence, 
corruption rentals enhances investment efficiency.  On the other hand, the second leitmotif contends that 
paying corruption rentals hinder entrepreneurial activity and investment growth within an economy 
Williamsp and Martinez-Perez (2016); d'Agostinoa, Dunneb, and Pieroni (2016) and Estrin, Korosteleva, and 
Mickiewicz (2016).  
This line of argument suggests that corruption instead of having a greasing effect actually has a sanding 
effect on the wheels of entrepreneurship growth. The paper argues that as utility maximizers, public officials 
responsible for issuing permits for start-ups in Zimbabwe are likely to be engaging in low-risk but high-
rewarding rent-seeking activities. Owing to the need to observe good corporate governance and to comply 
with stock exchange regulations, most large firms in Zimbabwe are audited annually. This makes it difficult 
for large companies to conceal corruption rentals in their financial records. Such a situation suggests that 
corrupt bureaucrats are likely to collude with potential and existing entrepreneurs in the informal sector or 
shadow economy where most entrepreneurial activities thrive. Consequently, this leaves new entrepreneurs 
and those entrepreneurs operating in the shadow economy more exposed to grand corruption since corrupt 
bureaucrats face lower risks of detection. In Zimbabwe, it is likely that is corruption misallocating 
entrepreneurial talent towards rent-seeking activities. It is also distorting sectoral priorities in the allocation 
of public resources and technology choices within small entrepreneurial firms. In addition, most entrepreneurs 
are likely to be illiquid and credit- constrained, thereby making it hard to pursue legal recourse in the event of 
being forced to pay corruption rentals. This reasoning imply that entrepreneurs who fail to pay corruption 
rentals are likely to forsake their innovations leading to lower domestic investment equilibrium in the country.  
Most empirical studies in developing countries that that examine the effect of corruption on the growth of 
entrepreneurship have focused on regional and cross-country studies (see (Delavallade, 2012; Faruq & Webb, 
2013; Olken & Pande, 2011; Williams, Horodnic, & Windebank, 2015)). However at country-level, there is 
negligible literature in many developing countries that on the effects of corruption on entrepreneurship 
growth. For instance, the impact of corruption on the growth of entrepreneurship in Zimbabwe has not been 
extensively interrogated even though the country has consistently scored lower on both the Transparent 
International Perception of Corruption Index and the World Bank Ease of Doing Business.  The country’s 
unemployment rate is estimated to be over ninety percent, suggesting that most people have no choice but to 
opt for self-employment using their entrepreneurial skills. In addition, the economy has been in economic 
recession for the past five years, implying also that opportunity-driven entrepreneurship may not be the main 
motivation for the people to opt for self-employment, but rather, people are being pushed into 
entrepreneurship by necessity.  
As our main contribution to empirical literature, we investigate the linkage between corruption, 
entrepreneurship activities and economic growth using ordinary Least Regression Technique for the period 
1998 to 2016. We believe that using a positivist philosophy is likely to bring to the fore more objective 
findings given that the few studies on corruption in Zimbabwe have often relied on surveys. We argue that 
pursuing an interpretivist approach by using surveys and interviews in order to investigate corruption is likely 
to lead to biased inferences since corruption is illegal both to the payer and receiver of a bribe.  All most all 
corrupt practices are done in privacy between two willing parties who in complicit prefer to remain 
anonymous in order to avoid being criminally prosecuted.  Hence, using survey approaches the extant study 
argues that the researcher is left with insufficient information on the extent of corruption on entrepreneurial 
activities. The strategy of this paper is as follows; the first section covers background and introduction, the 
second section is on literature review, the third section covers the methodology while the final section 
presents findings and recommendations. 
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2. Literature Review 
Entrepreneurship is a key cogwheel for rapid economic recovery and a crucial engine of technological 
progress, economic and social growth. According to Muzurura (2018) entrepreneurs have introduced new 
technologies that have spawned countless industries, creating jobs and improving the social and economic 
conditions of nations. Dutta and Sobel (2016) examined the effects of corruption in seven countries and 
reported that corruption under a bad investment climate hurts entrepreneurship. In contrast, Dreher and 
Gassebner (2013) show that corruption helps entrepreneurship and economic growth. They argue that 
corruption creates private and social deadweight losses and hence, entrepreneurs are willing to pay corruption 
rentals (bribes) in order to circumvent red tape that reduces productivity. Estrin et al. (2016) suggest that less 
corruption and stronger protection of property rights increases the growth of entrepreneurship. When 
barriers to opening new business by entrepreneurs are severe, being able to bribe political agents can ease the 
business start-up process thereby improving the level of entrepreneurial activity in an economy relative to an 
environment in which there was less corruption (Dutta & Sobel, 2016). The Transparent International (2018) 
reveals that corruption is much more likely to propagate where democratic foundations are feeble and also 
where undemocratic and populist politicians can use it to their advantage. The report adds that corruption 
produces a vicious cycle, where corruption destabilises democratic institutions and, in turn, weak institutions 
are less able to control corruption. Festus, Bassey, and Uyang (2014) in a study of Nigeria demonstrate that 
high information costs and limited access to resources may increase the potential gains from corruption. 
Corruption helps to grease the wheels of economic activity and can allow entrepreneurs to bypass costly 
regulation and engage in productive activity at lower costs (Bologna & Ross, 2015; Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; 
Dutta & Sobel, 2016).  
By measuring the linkage between institutional quality, corruption and the shadow economy (Wiseman & 
Young, 2013) establish that corruption affects the size of the shadow economy and hence, creating a negative 
relationship with entrepreneurship. Corruption shifts the allocation of resources towards more corruptible 
activities because entrepreneurs recognize the ability to profit from those activities (d'Agostinoa et al., 2016; 
Williams & Horodnic, 2015a). As far back (Leff, 1964) suggested that if the government has erred in its 
decision, the course made possible by corruption may well be the better one. Similarly, Huntington (1968) 
observed that corruption might be a way of achieving certain benefits which make work in the formal economy 
easier such as winning a contract from a public authority, getting a licence or getting investment permits. 
Alvarez and Urbano (2011) examined a panel data of Latin American countries over a period between 2004 
and 2009 in order to investigate the influence of the environmental factors in entrepreneurship. Their findings 
indicated that factors such as political instability, corruption control and role models affect the growth of 
entrepreneurship in Latin American countries.  
Wiseman (2016) opines that public officials such as law enforcement who are less visible to the public eye 
are likely to accrue corruption rentals from smaller firms and new entrepreneurs. The findings infer that 
entrepreneurs and small firms will probable flee corruption by taking their business underground. Dreher and 
Gassebner (2013) show that collusion between firms and corrupt officials in high-income countries result in a 
negative-substitutive-relationship between corruption and the size of shadow economy. Liu and Mikesell 
(2014) show that corruption reduces economic growth, lowers investment, and corrodes trust in government 
officials creating an institutional environment which pushes entrepreneurs from productive to destructive 
activities. Olken and Pande (2011) concur, in corrupt regimes, rent-seeking and cronyism crowd-out value-
creating entrepreneurship.   
Corruption reduces economic growth, lowers domestic investment, and corrodes trust in government 
officials creating an institutional environment which pushes entrepreneurs from productive to destructive 
activities (Holcombe & Boudreaux, 2015; Mawuli & Stinchfield, 2013; Williamss & Shahid, 2016). However, 
we argue that the above observation suffer from the likely effect of reverse causality when the prospects of 
accruing more corruption related incomes (after paying corruption rentals and obtaining required documents) 
may also motivate entrepreneurs to pay corruption rentals in turn for bureaucrats offering more market 
restrictions. Liu and Mikesell (2014) aver that corruption tends to prevail when barriers to entry are high and 
bribe givers face less competition. Corruption not only lowers economic output but also shifts resources 
toward some industries and away from others (Bologna & Ross, 2015); (Estrin et al., 2016; Muzurura, 2018; 
Wiseman & Young, 2013). Aidt (2016) reports the close connection between corruption, rent-seeking and 
corruption.  
Khan and Quaddus (2015) observe that in more corrupt countries, corruption shifts entrepreneurial 
activity toward less competitive industries in which connections and cronyism carry more weight, making 
rents from corruption more readily available. According to Wiseman (2016) corruption and shadow economy 
size are positively related and both contagious and cross-contagious in the U.S. states. Greater entrepreneurial 
activity is nurtured by, among others the availability of credit and venture capital, solid laws and well-defined 
property rights, good political and economic institutions, and efficient regulation of the economy (Aidt, 2016; 
Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Dutta & Sobel, 2016; Wiseman, 2016). However, the quality of the legal system, 
restrictions on international trade, and regulations do not significantly affect entrepreneurial activity (Doern 
& Goss, 2014; Efendic, Mickiewicz, & Rebmann, 2015). Williamsp and Martinez-Perez (2016) say that 
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opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs create their small business in order to seize an opportunity in the 
market. However, necessity-motivated entrepreneurs do so by necessity because they might not have any 
other career alternatives (ECA, 2016). Opportunity motivated entrepreneurs are more sensitive to corruption 
and more likely to grease the wheels compared to necessity motivated entrepreneurs (Welter, 2011; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2011). Under corrupt-ridden business environments, it is difficult to calculate and monitor the 
payoffs of a new venture as investments in innovation or economic opportunities become uncertain and 
transaction cost increases (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012; Williams, Martinez-Perez, & Kedir, 2016a). In a 
highly corrupted business environments, talented individuals prefer unproductive or destructive activities over 
productive ones (Desai, Acs, & Weitzel, 2013). From the institutional standpoint, corruption is a by-product of 
formal institutional imperfections which leads to an asymmetry arising between formal and informal 
institutions (Wiseman, 2016).   
The reason that corruption is often found to be greater in developing than in developed countries is  due 
to the deficiencies of formal institutions are greater (Williams et al., 2016a). Mair, Marti, and Ventresca (2012) 
also observed that the greater prevalence of corruption in developing economies than developed economies 
was due to the huge formal institutional deficiencies that led to incongruence between formal and informal 
institutions. At the macro-level, countries with a high level of corruption display relatively lower levels of firm 
performance (Faruq & Webb, 2013; Williams & Horodnic, 2015a). In the African perspective, Faruq and Webb 
(2013) report that less productive firms are more likely to pay corruption rentals. Mawuli and Stinchfield 
(2013) argue that corruption reduces the heavy bureaucratic burden and cumbersome regulations.  
Wiseman (2016) agrees, bureaucratic regulations and red tape that hinder entrepreneurship activities 
aided by formal institutional imperfections. Jiang and Nie (2014) establish that payments given by 
entrepreneurs to public officials in return for services help them to navigate the market failures induced by the 
failings of formal institutions. At a country-level corruption was seen to boost economic development (Jiang & 
Nie, 2014; Muzurura, 2018). The assertion suggests that corruption contributes positively to entrepreneurial 
activity performance because it compensates for the consequences of an ineffective institutional framework, the 
weak rule of law and lack of laws that protect private property rights. For instance, Ayaydin and Hayaloglu 
(2014) examined the relationship between firm growth and corruption in 41 manufacturing firms in Turkey, 
and demonstrated that making corrupt payments or speed money to public officials had a positive effect on 
firm growth. However, Lavallée and Roubaud (2011) find no association between corruption and firm output. 
Williams et al. (2016a) analysed 132 countries and reported that corruption in the form of bribery enhanced 
firm performance with firms that pay public officials to get things done. They also reported that small firms 
that paid bribes had 13.9 percent and 48 percent higher average annual sales and productivity growth rates 
respectively. Meon and Weill (2010) used data from 69 developed and developing countries and found positive 
evidence for the greasing the wheels hypothesis in situations where institutions were ineffective. The findings 
imply that some firms are motivated to pay some additional speed money in order to reduce the time lag 
involved in many bureaucratic procedures.  
Corruption can also raise the cost of operations, which can have a negative effect on survival of young 
firms (Athanasouli, Goujard, & Sklias, 2012). Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, and Perlitz (2010) show that 
corruption raises the level of business uncertainty and reduces the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest and 
create new innovative companies. Where institutions are weak, entrepreneurs can become exposed to and 
embroiled in corrupt practices (Xheneti, Smallbone, & Welter, 2012). Institutional framework that prevails in 
a country is essential for shaping entrepreneurial orientation, new venture creation, aspirations, perceptions 
and economic growth (Doern & Goss, 2014; Efendic et al., 2015; Welter, 2011). Obtaining credit is a major 
constraint on entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies (Aidis et al., 2012).  
Estrin et al. (2016) suggest that entrepreneurs and small firms often either have to resort to the informal 
credit markets or resort to bribing bureaucrats to secure the access to capital. The likelihood for entrepreneurs 
to be embroiled in corruption is affected by the perception of how many other individuals in the society are 
engaged in corrupt arrangements (Muzurura, 2018). Taxation reduces the reward to entrepreneurial 
innovation and therefore discourages investments that are important for economic growth (Fiorino, Galli, & 
Petrarca, 2012; Glaeser, Kerr, & Kerr, 2015; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2013). This viewpoint suggests 
that minimizing the tax burden on successful entrepreneurs could encourage more people to try to become 
successful entrepreneurs and innovators.  
Aghion, Cagé, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016) report that entrepreneurs  frequently rely heavily on public goods 
such as infrastructure and legal systems, therefore, higher taxation can raise expected returns on 
entrepreneurial activities and enhance economic growth especially if the taxes are used to provide public 
goods. The findings imply that a high taxation regime and redistribution can help to increase investment 
opportunities for entrepreneurs in an economy with imperfect credit markets. Nanda (2011); Djankov, Ganser, 
McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2010) and Rohlin, Rosenthal, and Ross (2013) have also demonstrated the 
impact of corruption and taxation on entrepreneurial activities. Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2011) and 
Glaeser, Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010) also provide extensive discussions of the nexus among corruption, public 
finances, and economic growth. We argue that whilst corruption may cause policy distortions, nevertheless 
this may create problems of simultaneity bias among public finance and economic growth. 
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3. Methodology 
In order to obviate the estimation of a spurious regression in this study, model diagnostic tests such as 
stationarity, multicollinearity, autocorrelations, heteroscedasticity and model specification tests were carried 
out before data the interpretation of the model.  
 
4. Conceptual Framework 
The paper develops a Schumpeterian growth model showing the relationship between corruption and 
entrepreneurship. Our model builds on the important framework that was developed by Aghion et al. (2016) 
and also has theoretical and empirical links with studies carried out by Glaeser et al. (2015); Haltiwanger et al. 
(2013) and Acemoglu, Ufuk, Harun, Nicholas, and Kerr (2018). First, we assume that the economy of 
Zimbabwe consists of a representative household who has choices between consumption and leisure. We can 
therefore use a continuous time model given by; 
          (1) 
Where Lt, represent labour supply by the household, Ct is consumption. The labour supply can be used for 
entrepreneurial activities (LE) and to provide public infrastructure (LP). We also assume that the household has 
a budget constraint given by; 
         (2) 
Where  denotes the wage rate,  is dividend from asset holdings in a firm,  is new investment by an 
entrepreneur and   represent government taxes used in provision of pure public goods or public 
infrastructure used by entrepreneurs. We assume a constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology 
given by the following equation; 
            (3) 
The equation shows that the final consumption of good Qt is produced using capital Kt and the basket of 
intermediate varieties Yt as per CRS production function. If we assume that  then Qt equals Yt. This 
implies that the final good is produced the intermediate goods basket Yt only which is also produced using the 
CES aggregator given by; 
           (4) 
(For proof of this equation see Aghion et al. (2016)). In the above equation, p indexes a unique product line 
and using the Betrand pay-off matrix, only the latest innovation by an entrepreneur is active in equilibrium. 
Entrepreneurs rely heavily on the government to provide quality public infrastructure. In particular, public 
infrastructure such as roads, railway and communication networks help the innovation efforts of entrepreneurs 
by reducing an entrepreneur’s operating costs. We therefore assume that infrastructure (ϕt) stock depreciates 
per annum at the rate φα ∊ (0, 1). However, if the government invests IFt in new infrastructure using money 
from tax revenue, we can express the law of motion for the public infrastructure as follows; 
           (5) 
To produce IFt units of infrastructure with a one to one technology, the government hires LGT workers at; 
            (6) 
The government taxes profits from entrepreneurial activities are Ԥt using tax rate Ԏ ∊ (0, Ԏ). We assume 
that taxation revenue is subject to corruption rentals at a fraction 𝝓∊ (0, 1). Resultantly, only the proportion 
(1- 𝝓)/100 turns into government investment in public infrastructure. 
            (7) 
Where          (8) 
Aghion et al. (2016) say that the same amount of tax payers’ money turns into better infrastructure if 
government institutions (such as the Police and Anti-Corruption Agencies) that deal with corruption are also 
effective and efficient. However, corrupted money 𝝓Tt is added to the household budget as revenue and the 
resource constraint  with all expenses shown in labour units. We can assume that an entrepreneur 
produces only one good and that output is produced with a well-behaved neoclassical production function with 
positive and strictly diminishing marginal product of physical capital. We use a Cobb-Douglas production 
function such that production at time t is given by; 
             (9) 
Where,  is output (GDP), Kt new innovations, Gt public infrastructure Ht stocks of human capital and Kt, 
are the, Ct, public corruption and Lt at time t.  Adopting an endogenous growth model where any combination 
of the capital inputs exhibits constant returns to scale, such that; 
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 Ft as the product of the level of entrepreneurship and other institutional factors at time t, such that; 
                                              (10) 
Where Xt is the exogenous level of new technology introduced by the entrepreneur, Corrt   represents the 
level of corruption, and Ft is a row vector of exogenous variables that influence entrepreneurship output 
(proxied by the level of real GDP growth rate). The growth of entrepreneurship is subject to decreasing 
returns to scale with respect to physical and human capital. This implies that the economy over the long-run, 
due to corruption tends to have constant capital-labour, human capital-labour, and public capital-labour ratios 
which have been normalised to1.  
The econometric model specification can be expanded as follows: 
                           (11) 
Where the dependent variable entret represents entrepreneurial growth rate in Zimbabwe and was proxied 
by the real GDP growth rate. The GDP growth rate captures both the level of economic opportunities in a 
country as well as a pointer to unemployment and levels of poverty. A rising GDP suggests increasing market 
size and hence, the growth of more opportunities seeking entrepreneurs. On the other hand, a low GDP 
suggest unemployment, low incomes and poverty and hence driving the growth of necessity driven 
entrepreneurs. Ln tax represents natural logarithm of tax revenue. High taxation growth rates depress 
entrepreneurial activities and may also drive existing entrepreneurs in the shadow economy which is highly 
unobservable.  Corrt denotes the corruption variable. Studies on the effects of corruption on entrepreneurship 
growth use data from different sources such as, the Transparent International Perception of Corruption index, 
the Institute for Management Development and the World Economic Forum, the Business Environment 
Survey from 2000 developed by the World Bank and the University of Basel (WB/UB), the Business 
International index (BI) demonstrated in Mauro (1995) and the Political Risk Service’s International Country 
Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG. Our study relied the Transparent International Perception of Corruption index 
(2018). The PCI is computed as an average of different surveys of perceptions of corruption in a country in a 
year and a country is ranked from 0 to 10 with 10 being the least corrupt and 0 the most corrupt. The PCI 
corruption database are thus based on subjective perceptions of experts, and in the study we assume that the 
PCI are correlated with underlying real levels of corruption in Zimbabwe. An alternative is using a survey 
methodology. However, relying on primary data collection on the number of people convicted for corruption 
and abuse of office for personal gain could suffer from intrinsic biases regarding reliability, validity and 
usability. In any case, the corruption data base of Zimbabwe Republic Police and Anti-Corruption Agencies are 
a composition of the number of convictions. The database do not differentiate among various forms of 
corruption, such as nepotism, frauds, embezzlement of public funds or bribery. These constituents of 
corruption have different effects on entrepreneurial growth in Zimbabwe. However, using the PCI index 
comes with many shortcomings. The PCI is constructed using a survey of perceived corruption, hence, the 
index reflect perceptions only and cannot be considered as a fool-proof objective measure of actual levels of 
corruption in the country.  The perception of corruption in a country depends on a number of multiple factors 
such as individual’s culture, the nature of the former coloniser, institutions, political leadership, age, gender, 
education and possibly a person’s social standing. Many of these factors have not been incorporated into the 
PCI. The paper argues that outside expert assessments of corruption in developing countries such as 
Zimbabwe correspond little, if at all, with the experiences and views of actual entrepreneurs of those countries. 
The extant study argues that the hidden nature of corruption often results in definitional variances even in 
heavily used indices such as PCI. Whilst recognizing the limitations of perception-based indices, many 
researchers have nevertheless been able to use them to significantly advance the study of corruption (see 
Muzurura (2017)). Although corruption may grease the wheels of entrepreneurial activities we argue that any 
benefit that accrue from it is more than offset by negative impact of corruption, especially slowing down 
entrepreneurial activities in the country. A number of studies have used this variable by adopting various 
metrics that range from qualitative (corruption surveys) to quantitative approaches such as number of 
convictions (d'Agostinoa et al., 2016; Estrin et al., 2016; Pinotti, 2012; Williamsp & Martinez-Perez, 2016). 
Inst denotes public institutions that fight corruption, Lit denotes literacy rate and  is the error term. We thus 
anticipate negative  coefficients and a positive  coefficient.  
The major challenge in econometric specification of this form is that corruption can be both an 
endogenous and exogenous variable. Concerning the former, a change in entrepreneurship growth rate might 
give rise to the corruption through increased demand for permits, licences and other regulatory requirements. 
The demand of these documents are inelastic and thus entrepreneurs are forced to pay corruption rentals to 
regulatory officials, and hence giving rise to more corruption rentals. On the contrary, declining 
entrepreneurial growth rate may also shift economic activities towards corruption since rent seeking by 
corrupt bureaucrats becomes the most productive way to make money than actual entrepreneurial activities. In 
addition, causality might also run in both directions. Corruption is likely to be higher in terms of GDP per 
capita since the country does not only lack adequate resources to fight corruption effectively, but also there is 
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no political commitment to fight corruption. To resolve this issues the study carried out Granger causality 
tests on entrepreneurship and corruption using the following equations.  Starting from a simple (Granger, 
1969) specification the Equation 11 below can be built follows; 
 
                 (11) 
 
                      (12) 
The two equations can be expanded as shown below; 
                                          (13) 
                                                      (14) 
Where Entret-1 and Corrt-1 are stationary time series sequences, 𝛾   are intercept sequences and ɛt and 
μt   are uncorrected white noise error terms. S is the optimum lag length of 2 which was determined using the 
Akaike Information Criterion. We chose a lag length of 2 on the assumption that most start-ups in Zimbabwe 
took at least 2 years to grow owing to numerous constraints, and the chief constraint being corruption. In the 
specification, we postulated that corruption Granger caused entrepreneurship if   was not statistically and 
significantly equal to zero. Similarly, Entre Granger caused corruption if   was not equal to zero. If these two 
conditions held we concluded that there was bidirectional causality between the two variables. Nevertheless, if 
none of the conditions held we concluded that the two variables were independent and therefore there was 
non-Granger causality. Having specified Entrepreneurship and Corruption variables the likely four cases of 
causation are; if corruption causes the growth of entrepreneurship but the growth of entrepreneurship do not 
cause the growth of corruption it would be concluded that there is uni-directional causation from corruption 
and entrepreneurship. Similarly, if the growth of entrepreneurship causes the growth of corruption but the 
growth of corruption do not cause the growth of entrepreneurship it would be concluded that there exists an 
uni-directional causation from entrepreneurship to corruption. If entrepreneurship caused corruption and 
corruption caused entrepreneurial growth it would imply a bi-directional causation between the two variables. 
If entrepreneurial activities do not cause corruption growth and corruption growth does not cause growth of 
entrepreneurial activities it means that there exists no causal relationship between the corruption and 
entrepreneurial activities. The estimation of the Granger causality was carried out using the Generalised 
Method of Moments since such models are intended to handle auto-regressive properties in the explained 
variable when lagged values are included as explanatory variables. Secondary data used in the study was 
obtained from World Bank (2017) database. Regarding the data for corruption variable, the paper relied on 
Transparent International Perception of corruption indices (2018). 
 
5. Findings and Discussions 
As shown in Table 1, the independent variables did not move together in a systematic and hence, 
suggesting no multicollinearity. When independent variables are high correlated among themselves it 
becomes difficult to separate individual effects of each variable and this leads to wrong inference.  
 
Table-1. Multicollinearity. 
  Correlation Matrix     
 Variables Corruption Institutions lntax Literacy 
Corruption 1    
Institutions 0.425 1   
Ln tax 0.4888 0.721 1  
Literacy 0.090 -0.449 -0.013 1 
 
Table-2. Unit Root Test. 
Variables t-ADF  Critical-1% Critical-5% Conclusion 
DEntre -4.373 -4.373 -3.120 I(1) 
DCorruption -3.861 -4.122 -3.144 I(1) 
DInstitutions -3.317 -4.058 -3.120 I(1) 
ddLntax -4.171 -4.122 -3.145 I(2) 
Literacy -5.596 -4.200 -3.175 I(0) 
 
The Augmented Dickey and Fuller unit root test was used to investigate the null hypothesis that a 
variable had a unit root against the alternative of being stationary. The presence of unit root shows that the 
variables did not have constant mean, constant variance and constant autovariance. If variables are not 
stationary may lead to wrong inferences on the findings. All the probability value of ADF test statistic were 
compared to 0.01, 0.05 and 0.12. The results of unit root tests are shown in Table 2. Heteroscedasticity is a 
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major problem in time series data that is caused by non-standard errors. Using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
test Appendix B shows that the errors were homoscedastic. Other model diagnostic tests for correct model 
specification, autocorrelation and normality are shown in Appendix A, C and D respectively.  
 
Table-3. Regression Output. 
Dependent Variable: DGDPT_1   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
DCORR 13.517 5.111 2.645 0.0295 
DDLNTAX -7.124 2.041 -3.490 0.0082 
DINSTITUTIONS -10.214 5.254 -1.943 0.0878 
LIT -2.657 1.714 -1.550 0.1596 
C 260.966 166.685 1.565 0.1561 
R-squared 0.731     Mean dependent var 0.589 
Adjusted R-squared 0.596     S.D. dependent var 9.605 
S.E. of regression 6.105     Akaike info criterion 6.739 
Sum squared resid 298.176     Schwarz criterion 6.957 
Log likelihood -38.809     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.695 
F-statistic 5.426     Durbin-Watson stat 2.220 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.021    
 
The effect of corruption on entrepreneurial activities in Zimbabwe was found to be positive and 
statistically significant at 5 percent level of confidence. The findings indicate that a unit increase in corruption 
levels is expected to increase entrepreneurial activities in economy. Whilst these findings are surprising, 
however, a strong empirical evidence suggests that corruption greases entrepreneurial activities in many 
countries (see (Ayaydin & Hayaloglu, 2014; Estrin et al., 2016; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991)). The 
finding suggests that Zimbabwe entrepreneurs are risk takers and hence, prefer to pay corruption rentals as a 
way of circumventing government regulations and red tape. A possible explanation for the positive 
relationship rests on issues of timing and likely irreversibility of investments done by entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurial activities are very risk and involve sunk costs that may not be recoupable. In order to manage 
the value of waiting to carry out new start –ups, most entrepreneurs might opt to pay bribes to responsible 
officials in order to access vital documents. Taxes were found to be negative and significant at 10%. A one 
percent increases in taxes for entrepreneurs and new start up business will reduce entrepreneurial activities by 
at least 700%. The results are consistent with a number of studies by (see (Fiorino et al., 2012; Glaeser et al., 
2015; Haltiwanger et al., 2013)). The effect of institutions on entrepreneurial activities was established to be 
negative suggesting that a unit increase in deficient public institutions reduces entrepreneurial activities by 
1000%. Our findings suggest that corruption reduces could be corroding trust in bureaucrats and likely to be 
creating an institutional environment that is pushing entrepreneurs towards destructive activities compared to 
productive activities. Holcombe and Boudreaux (2015); Williamss and Shahid (2016); Mair et al. (2012) and 
Barro (1991) also reported similar findings in developing economies. Our findings do not confirm the effect of 
education on entrepreneurial activities. Regarding the direction of causality between entrepreneurial activities 
and corruption, as shown in the table below, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that in Zimbabwe 
there is a one way causality running from Entrepreneurship to Corruption. Our findings imply that 
entrepreneurs are forced to pay corruption rentals in order to obviate government bureaucracy and inefficient 
public institutions. The growth in the number of entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe is likely to catalysed corruption 
through increased demand for permits, licences and other regulatory requirements. The effect is likely to be 
more pronounced on opportunity-driven entrepreneurs than necessity-driven entrepreneurs because the 
former is likely to be well- resourced and connected and therefore, are able to pay speed money. Even though 
there is a feedback mechanism from low entrepreneurial growth to high corruption and from high 
entrepreneurial growth to low corruption, we argue that the growth process cannot begin unless reasonably 
effective institutions in place. 
 
Table-4. Granger Causality 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 Entrepreneurs do not Granger Cause Corruption  19  4.270 0.0254 
 Corruption does not Granger Cause Entrepreneurship  0.497 0.6141 
Sample: 1998 2015 
Lags: 2  
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Both necessity and opportunity driven entrepreneurial activities in Zimbabwe are being driven by 
weakening economic growth, political and economic instability and high levels of unemployment. Zimbabwe 
has been listed as one of the most corrupt countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study examined the nexus 
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between entrepreneurial activities and corruption in Zimbabwe. Our findings suggest that entrepreneurial 
activities are being curtailed by high taxes and deficient public institutions. We also show a positive 
relationship between corruption and entrepreneurial activities. The study recommends that policy makers 
should reduce taxes, reduce red tape and increase the efficiency of public institutions that deal with 
entrepreneurs. 
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Appendix-A. Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: EQ01   
Specification: DGDPT_1 DCORR DDLNTAX DINSTITUTIONS LIT  C 
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
 Value df Probability 
t-statistic  0.120751  7  0.9073 
F-statistic  0.014581 (1, 7)  0.9073 
Likelihood ratio  0.027050  1  0.8694 
F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares 
Test SSR  0.619799  1  0.619799 
Restricted SSR  298.1768  8  37.27210 
Unrestricted SSR  297.5570  7  42.50814 
Unrestricted SSR  297.5570  7  42.50814 
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LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -38.80899  8   
Unrestricted LogL -38.79547  7   
Unrestricted Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: DGDPT_1   
Method: Least Squares   
Appendix-B. Heteroscedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 1.941812     Prob. F(4,8) 0.1969 
Obs*R-squared 6.404049     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.1709 
Scaled explained SS 2.412607     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.6604 
 
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1932.952 802.0715 -2.409949 0.0425 
DCORR 32.28225 24.59258 1.312683 0.2257 
DDLNTAX 6.686314 9.822505 0.680714 0.5153 
DINSTITUTIONS 12.81782 25.28189 0.506996 0.6258 
LIT 20.15844 8.245794 2.444694 0.0403 
R-squared 0.492619     Mean dependent var 22.93668 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238929     S.D. dependent var 33.67409 
S.E. of regression 29.37707     Akaike info criterion 9.882029 
Sum squared resid 6904.100     Schwarz criterion 10.09932 
Log likelihood -59.23319     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.837367 
F-statistic 1.941812     Durbin-Watson stat 1.833491 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.196862    
 
Appendix-C. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 0.120810     Prob. F(2,6) 0.8883 
Obs*R-squared 0.503246     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7775 
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 16   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
DCORR -0.730788 6.039159 -0.121008 0.9076 
DDLNTAX -0.247428 2.425248 -0.102022 0.9221 
DINSTITUTIONS 0.209558 6.429936 0.032591 0.9751 
LIT -0.583676 2.422135 -0.240976 0.8176 
C 56.57372 235.3972 0.240333 0.8181 
RESID(-1) -0.190106 0.459143 -0.414046 0.6932 
RESID(-2) -0.187741 0.531979 -0.352910 0.7362 
R-squared 0.038711     Mean dependent var -2.70E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.922578     S.D. dependent var 4.984783 
S.E. of regression 6.911753     Akaike info criterion 7.008057 
Sum squared resid 286.6340     Schwarz criterion 7.312260 
Log likelihood -38.55237     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.945529 
F-statistic 0.040270     Durbin-Watson stat 1.905075 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999453    
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Appendix-D. Normality Tests 
0
1
2
3
4
-10.0 -7.5 -5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5
Series: Residuals
Sample 2000 2012
Observations 13
Mean      -2.70e-15
Median   0.410200
Maximum  10.38056
Minimum -9.013636
Std. Dev.   4.984783
Skewness   0.228153
Kurtosis   2.989613
Jarque-Bera  0.112841
Probability  0.945142
 
 
 
